When ethnic conflict is likely people seek safety in homogenous neighborhoods, but does this ethnic segregation decrease communal violence? This paper argues that local segregation causes violence by eroding interethnic trust. Although segregation reduces violent disputes between individuals, the possibility of positive interethnic contact is also lower in segregated areas. Where levels of interethnic trust are low, it is easier for political leaders and other extremists to build support for communal violence. I demonstrate that segregation increases the incidence of violence using a new dataset measuring ethnic composition and violence across approximately 700 small localities in Kenya's Rift Valley Province during Kenya's 2007/08 post-election crisis. Because segregation is likely endogenous to violence, I draw on Kenya's history of land settlement to instrument for segregation. I also demonstrate that it is unlikely that local segregation increases violence by increasing groups' organizational capacity for violence.
Introduction
Residential segregation along ethnic lines occurs when relations between members of different ethnic groups are poor. Ethnic conflict has increased ethnic segregation a wide range of settingsreligious riots in India and Nigeria, sectarian violence in Ireland and Iraq, and civil war in the former Yugoslavia. Ethnic segregation is also costly because people are unwilling or unable to access opportunities and public services lying just outside their ethnic enclave. The costs of segregation on African Americans in the United States are well-documented (?, ?, ?) . However, segregation may also have a negative impact on members of nonmarginalized groups because it impedes potentially profitable trade and necessitates the creation of separate public services.
1 Despite the individual and economic costs that segregation imposes, policymakers are more likely to advocate or tacitly support ethnic segregation where conflict has occurred to keep the peace (?). However, people may willingly bear the costs segregation imposes if it reduces ethnic conflict. To individuals living where ethnic violence is likely to occur, a reasonable "working hypothesis" is that living in segregated areas reduces the probability of violent interactions with members of other ethnic groups. 2 However, if segregation makes communal violence more likely, residential sorting along ethnic lines may have negative externalities.
This paper argues that segregation increases communal violence by decreasing interethnic trust -that is, people's willingness to believe the worst about the intentions of members of other ethnic groups. Existing research on communal violence suggests that interethnic mistrust exacerbates communal violence. Rumors and real or imagined hostile encounters between members of other ethnic groups play a prominent trigger and exacerbate communal violence (?, ?) . Ethnic tensions may place participants in a security dilemma, whereby conflict arises between members of two peacefully-intentioned groups when actions one side takes to enhance their security are perceived 1 Research on Kosovo and Northern Ireland, for example, demonstrates that segregation leads to the costly duplication of public services (?, ?, ?) . ? demonstrates that market segmentation is higher in segregated areas of Malawi.
2 ? and ? show that safety is an important consideration for actual (and potential) victims of violence in civil wars.
as threatening by the other side (?, ?) . Several factors affect the likelihood that people will view members of other ethnic groups as hostile. ? and ? have argued that politicians who are more likely to lose office have more to gain from fomenting mistrust and violence. Although these political incentives to encourage violence are important, this paper focuses on local residential segregation as a factor contributing to interethnic violence.
When violence is likely to occur in a neighborhood, people must determine whether members of other ethnic groups pose a danger to them. Under this security dilemma, disputes between individuals from separate ethnic groups can escalate to episodes of communal violence because of false assumptions regarding out-group hostility and solidarity. One woman living in a clash-prone part of Rift Valley Province in Kenya described this dynamic well, " [t] hat is how it always starts:
petty crimes which are blamed on entire communities, and before you know it, people are killing Although ethnic segregation reduces interaction across ethnic lines, it also alters the character of and social meaning given to the interethnic contact that does occur. Several studies find that people living near members of other ethnic groups are more tolerant than those living in homogeneous places. Where interethnic trust and tolerance are low, elites with an interest in fomenting ethnic violence may find it easier to build support for ethnic violence. Moreover, where interethnic trust is low people may be more willing to stigmatize coethnic perpetrators of violence (?).
The "working hypothesis" that segregated areas are safer for individuals also introduces an empirical challenge to the study of the relationship between local segregation and violence. Because self-segregation is a rational response to conflict for ordinary people seeking to reduce their exposure to violence and intolerance, we are more likely to observe segregation where relations between members of different ethnic groups are fraught. Even where ethnic violence has not oc-curred, local ethnic demography is likely endogenous to the quality of intergroup relations. As ?
argues, neighborhoods may become segregated if even a small minority of people have a strong preference to live in a homogenous area. This paper, in contrast to existing literature on segregation and violence, addresses this endogeneity problem using instrumental variables regression.
This paper examines violence and segregation across 700 localities in Kenya's Rift Valley
Province during an episode of political violence that took place between late December 2007 to March 2008. In this period roughly 1,100 people were killed, and 350,000 people displaced from several parts of the country (?). Although a disputed presidential election triggered these violent events, there is considerable local variation in the incidence of violence and many people were targeted for violence based on their ethnic identity and partisan affiliation, which often coincided.
To instrument for ethnic segregation, I draw on Kenya's colonial and post-colonial history of migration and settlement. By the end of the colonial period in 1964, about half of the agricultural land in Kenya had been transferred to Europeans and most of this land was in the Rift Valley (?, ?).
Africans not employed on European farms were moved to ethnically exclusive native reserves. The likely end of British colonial rule altered ethnic demography in Kenya, particularly in Rift Valley
Province. In the 1950s, restrictions on internal migration by Africans were removed, and most land held by European farmers was transferred to African ownership through private purchases and government-sponsored schemes. Between 1963 and 1979 the population of some districts more than doubled due to migration (?). Africans formed land-buying companies and cooperatives to buy large farms, and these organizations were often ethnically homogenous. Because of this form of joint migration, farms are occupied by members of different ethnic groups in some areas.
Drawing on an original dataset of colonial-era cadastral (property) boundary maps, I use the extent to which a locality was divided by the boundaries of farms during the colonial period to instrument for present-day segregation. The potential contemporary segregation of locations that were more subdivided by property boundaries at the end of the colonial period is higher for two reasons. First, in the areas that were most divided by the boundaries of European farms, more sep-arate transactions transferred land from Europeans to Africans. Therefore, adjacent farms are more likely to be settled by members of different ethnic groups. Second, farm boundaries, like railroad tracks in U.S. cities, facilitate self-segregation by reducing the coordination costs associated with segregation (?, ?).
Because it is difficult to measure the incidence of conflict at a highly disaggregated level, I
use two proxies for violence -the number of internally displaced persons from a location and the incidence of post-election fires in a location. Using these two measures, I show that segregation is positively correlated with violence in OLS regressions and if I instrument for segregation using colonial-era farm boundaries. However, because the IV estimates of the effect of segregation are much larger than the OLS estimates, I also show that the farm boundaries index is itself positively correlated with violence. Because spatial separation of groups in an area is related to its ethnic diversity, I demonstrate these findings are robust to alternative ways of conceptualizing ethnic segregation and diversity.
Besides arguing that segregation causes violence by making people more suspicious of members of other ethnic groups, I present evidence it is unlikely that segregation increases violence by enhancing organizational capacity. To do so, I take advantage of the fact that geography makes coordinating violence more difficult. If segregation increased violence by making it easier to carry out attacks, we would expect segregation to have a greater effect on violence where organizing violence is difficult; however, the evidence suggests this is not the case. 4 ? and ? argue that geographic concentration gives elites the incentive to use violence to gain political autonomy. I focus on organizational capacity rather than political autonomy as a goal because local segregation probably could not give ethnic groups the political autonomy these authors focus on at the smaller geographic scale examined in this paper.
Local ethnic demography varies considerably across Rift Valley Province, which comprised 22% of Kenya's total population (6.4 million people) in 1999. The province is shared, to varying degrees, by five of Kenya's largest ethnic groups. To provide context for the empirical analysis that follows, I describe the origins of ethnic demography and conflict in the region.
Rift Valley Province was highly ethnically diverse upon independence because of both geography and colonial policy. In 1962, the Kalenjin were the largest and most populous group in the region with 62% of the population. However, members of other ethnic groups had a significant presence, including the Kikuyu (17%), Maasai (7%), Luhya (6%), Luo (3%), and Kisii (1%). The removal of restrictions on internal migration and the end of colonial rule changed the ethnic landscape of the province. In the study area, the proportion of Kalenjins and Maasais has decreased relative to that of other ethnic groups. Members of some Kalenjin sub-groups have migrated to new areas within the province. Although migration has also occurred in less densely populated native reserve areas, transferring European-owned farms to Africans played a large role in this demographic change. Upon independence, few Africans had the resources to purchase settlers' farms outright. However, a handful of politically connected Kenyans acquired a large share of the land. ? estimates that politically-connected individuals acquired a sixth of these farms.
Ordinary people acquired land on settlers' farms in one of two ways. First, many Africans who settled former European farms purchased that land together by forming land-buying companies or cooperatives (?). Joint land-buying schemes were often ethnically exclusive because it was difficult to collect information about potential settlement sites hundreds of miles away. In the immediate post-independence period, land-buying companies and cooperatives were dominated by Kikuyus, but Luhyas, Kisii, and Kalenjins also settled former European-held lands jointly (?).
Second, some white-owned farms were redistributed to Africans through government-sponsored settlement schemes in programs funded first by the British, and later by international donors. In these schemes, the highly concessional terms upon which land was sold encouraged rent-seeking.
A policy of selling land to Africans who had worked on these farms as employees made it hard for British and later Kenyan officials to keep the population on government-sponsored schemes ethnically homogenous (?, ?).
Ethnic diversity has also increased in parts of Rift Valley Province not granted to Europeans during the colonial period. Restrictions on migration meant that prior to independence land was scarce and land prices relatively high in areas settled by agricultural groups, particularly the Kikuyu and Kisii (?, ?). Also, members of the two Kalenjin groups most involved in agriculture -the Kipsigis and the Nandi -have also migrated outside their colonial-era native reserves. Even where migrants purchased land from individual African owners, the descendants of some view these sales as illegitimate.
Large-scale ethnic violence in the region dates to the introduction of multi-party politics in the Figure 1 shows a map of the study area. 7 Locations, the administrative area used in the analysis below, have an average population of 9,000 and a median area of 22 square miles in this region. Locations are the second smallest administrative unit in Kenya.
Each location falls entirely within a district -the principle administrative jurisdiction -and a constituency -an electoral jurisdiction represented by a single Member of Parliament.
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It is difficult to acquire fine-grained data on violence and local ethnic demography where ethnic 6 Interview, August 20, 2008. 7 I exclude all exclude all locations in arid and semi-arid (ASAL) districts because it is more difficult to measure ethnic diversity reliably in those areas.
8 Summary statistics are in Table 4 in the Supplementary Appendix. conflict is common. I attempted to find other types of local-level data on violence with little success. The police aggregate reports of crime to the district level and the press focuses on areas well-known for violence. I describe the measurement of both variables and my instrument for segregation below.
Measuring Violence
My first outcome variable is the number of people from each location in camps for internally dis- In addition to data on IDPs, I use satellite images of fires in the post-election period (the five weeks following the election) as a proxy for violent events. An advantage of this proxy is that it can be geo-coded precisely (? Incidence of fires was much higher in the 2007/08 period than in any of the previous five years, and, as has been noted by others, fires occurred in unusual areas (?, ?).
As with the data on IDPs, the validity of the fires proxy warrants discussion. Perpetrators of violence may be more likely to light them in segregated settings where damage to the property of coethnics is less likely to occur. Therefore, if perpetrators of using violence prefer setting fires, they may be more likely to target opponents in segregated areas. Also, fires may occur that are unobserved by satellites. To understand which instances of violence are under-represented by the fires data and which election-related fires may not be observed, I spoke to chiefs and other bureaucrats in Kericho and Trans Nzoia in August 2008. My impression, though it is not a systematic one, is that fires are more likely to be observed if there are several dwellings concentrated together, 9 The active fire observations were generated in two stages. First, the satellites observe and record specific frequencies indicative of infra-red radiation. These thermal anomalies are fires but may also be emissions of hot gas or volcanic activity (?). Pixels on the satellite images are classified as containing an active fire using an algorithm developed and validated by ?, which considers the temperature of an area, the temperature of surrounding areas, and other factors. No fires will be observed in an area if it lies under cloud cover. However, as these events occur during the dry season, it is unlikely that many fires are missed, and cloud cover is unlikely to be correlated with any of the explanatory variables of interest here.
10 Data acquired by the author from Kenya Police.
and all regressions include controls for both population and area. Fires cannot be observed when the weather is poor, but cloud cover is likely exogenous to politics.
Each of these proxies for violence is imperfect. However, as the discussion above indicates, it is unlikely that the measurement errors associated with each with each of these variables lie in the same direction. Therefore, finding a relationship between both the number of IDPs and fire incidence ought to increase our confidence that segregation causes violence.
Measuring Local Ethnic Composition
Because ethnic demography is politically sensitive, the Kenyan government has not released data The underlying measure of ethnic diversity used in constructing Theil's Index is entropy, which is the uncertainty about the ethnic identity of a person in an area chosen at random. The entropy of location j is
where π gj is the proportion of registered voters in location j who come from group g. It is worth considering how entropy differs from the most commonly used measure of ethnic diversity -ethnic fractionalization -which is the probability that two randomly selected people in a country would be from two separate ethnic groups. Both measures equal zero in perfectly homogenous settings.
Measures of entropy and ethnic fractionalization are closely correlated but become less so as the number of ethnic groups increases because, unlike ethnic fractionalization, entropy does not have an upper bound at one.
Theil's Index measures how segregated ethnic groups are across polling stations in a location.
The value of the index for location j is:
T heil s Index j = 1 − The value of Theil's Index ranges from zero, perfect integration, to one for perfect segregation.
The maps in Figure 1 show the geographic incidence of ethnic fractionalization and segregation in the locations under study. The cross-hatched areas either lie outside Rift Valley Province or are arid and semi-arid districts excluded from our analysis. 
Identification Strategy
where a f is the area of a plot in the location, there are L farms (or parts of farms) in the location and A is the total area of the location. The CFDI is a modified version of Herfindahl index of market concentration and equals zero if farm boundaries do not divide a location. An alternative instrument one could construct from these data is a count of farms, but, unlike the CFDI, that measure is closely correlated with a location's area.
Data on the boundaries of colonial-era farms come from 87 large-scale (1:50,000) cadastral To account for the possibility that land value and agricultural potential determine the degree to which a location is subdivided, all first-stage regressions control for whether a location falls in the White Highlands as well as Area, Average Rainfall, Altitude, Proportion Rangeland, Terrain
Ruggedness, and Population Density in 1962. The instrument, therefore, is exogenous conditional upon including these variables. Appendix A.3 describes the origin and construction of these variables.
In the analysis that follows, the relationship between segregation and violence is modeled as: Table 1 shows OLS, reduced form, and two-stage least-squares estimates of the effect of segregation on violence. Although fire incidence and the number of people from a location in IDP camps are imperfect measures of violence, they both support the conclusion there is more conflict in segregated areas. 11 The IV estimates of the effect of diversity are higher than the OLS estimates. Weak instruments, which bias IV estimates, are not a problem here as the F-statistic for the instrument (12.8) exceeds the conventional rule of thumb value of 10 (Table 1) .
However, because of the difference in magnitude between the OLS and IV regressions, for the sake of transparency, I include the reduced form estimates of the CFDI on violence in Table 1 .
[ Table 1 about here]
Colonial-era farm boundaries may have affected the post-colonial ethnic diversity of an area and the spatial separation of groups. Ethnic diversity and segregation are closely related concepts.
11 As noted in Section 4, a location's distance to the borders of Rift Valley Province may affect whether displaced persons move to IDP camps rather than to areas in which members of their ethnic group are a majority. However, the effect of segregation on the number of IDPs remains the same controlling for a location's distance to the ethnic homelands of each of four groups that settled the former White Highlands. See Table 5 in the Supplementary Appendix.
Thiel's Index is zero in ethnically homogenous places. I evaluate whether the relationship between segregation and violence is robust to considering ethnic diversity by using a measure of segregation that takes a lower value in ethnically homogenous areas and by instrumenting for ethnic diversity.
In Table 2 , I replace Theil's Index with a measure of segregation (the Mutual Information Index) with a lower value where there is less uncertainty about a resident's ethnicity (?). Theil's Index is the Mutual Information Index normalized for the ethnic diversity (Entropy) in a region.
[ Table 2 about here] Table 2 shows that segregation, measured using this alternative index, has a statistically significant effect on the number of IDPs and the incidence of fires. Although the estimated effect of segregation on violence is greater when I use the MI Index to measure segregation, the substantive effects are roughly the same for both measures of segregation.
12
Because farm boundaries were determined before independence by British settlers and officials who deprived Africans of their land, it seems implausible that the location of farm boundaries were determined (or "assigned") referring to the ethnic divisions that later became salient in postcolonial Kenya. However, members of different ethnic groups' propensity to migrate and exposure to political violence vary. To examine ethnic group-specific effects, I calculated an index of segregation (the Dissimilarity Index) that measures the degree to which members of a specific group are separated from members of all other ethnic groups. I find that segregation of Kalenjins, Kikuyus, and Luhyas increases violence, but that of Kisiis and Maasais does not. Table 6 in the Supplementary Appendix I instrument for present-day ethnic diversity using the average distance as the crow flies of each location to the nearest area reserved for the Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luhya, Luo, and Maasai ethnic groups. As these areas were ethnically homogenous by law, places further from these ethnically exclusive reserves are more likely to have been settled by multiple groups upon independence. When both segregation and ethnic diversity are treated as endogenous regressors, the size of the coefficient on segregation is smaller, but the substantive effect remains roughly the same as the number of IDPs. However, the estimate of the effect of segregation on fires incidence narrowly misses statistical significance at conventional levels.
13 See Table 7 in the Supplementary Appendix. The negative coefficient on Maasai segregation is surprising and is probably a result of being a small minority in the most violent areas, and the Dissimilarity Index shows more variance for small groups.
While Table 1 shows that the degree to which colonial-era boundaries subdivide farms is correlated with segregation, does the CFDI satisfy the exclusion restriction? One post-independence policy that may lead to a violation of the exclusion restriction is the location of governmentsponsored settlement schemes. The early policy of the Settlement Fund Trustees was to settle African farmers on smaller ("mixed farms") rather than large-scale farms (?, ?). Therefore, it is possible that government-sponsored settlement schemes are more likely to be in areas that were more subdivided by European farm boundaries. Scholars have claimed that settlement schemes are more prone to violence (?). ? argues that settlement schemes cause violence because of the politicization of land allocation. However, settlement scheme locations are neither more nor less likely to be segregated or ethnically diverse. The p-value of difference of means tests on Segregation and on Ethnic Fractionalization are 0.59 and 0.21 respectively. Furthermore, the presence of a settlement scheme is not a statistically significant predictor of displacement and is negatively associated with post-election fires.
14 Another potential threat to the validity of the instrument arises if locations with higher land values were more likely to be subdivided. As discussed in Section 4.3, the historical record on land value and farm size is mixed. I claim that the CFDI is plausibly exogenous conditional upon the inclusion of variables controlling for land value and agricultural potential, including rainfall, altitude, rangeland, terrain ruggedness, and population density in 1962. One way to validate measures of land value is to compare them to a contemporary measure of land productivity. The Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) is commonly used to estimate crop yields (?). The index measures the greenness of an area from satellite imagery because healthy vegetation absorbs different parts of the electromagnetic spectrum than unhealthy or sparse vegetation. 15 The NDVI is closely correlated with the exogenous variables in this paper.
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I find that segregation causes violence in Kenya's Rift Valley Province but is this finding unique to this context? One possible concern regarding the external validity of these findings is that the resettlement of this region took place over a fairly short period. However, rates of economic migration are high in many developing countries, and increased segregation has often followed communal violence. Also, although segregation is often considered an urban phenomenon, there is more violence in segregated areas when urban areas are dropped from the analysis.
17

Mechanisms
The evidence suggests that segregation increases violence by decreasing interethnic trust rather than by making it easier to organize violence. As ? shows, self-reported levels of interethnic trust are lower in ethnically segregated locations across Kenya. The substantive effect of segregation is smaller for the outcome that requires greater organizational capacity -the production of fires. This finding is surprising because, as noted above, setting fire to dwellings in integrated areas may put a perpetrator's coethnics at risk.
I test for whether segregation affects violence by increasing organizational capacity using variation in the degree to which violence is easy to organize. If segregation works primarily through increasing organizational capacity, the effect of segregation on violence ought to be greater in places that are more remote and in places with difficult terrain.
To explore whether segregation has a greater effect on violence where the costs of organizing violence are higher, I divided locations using two variables that affect the cost of organizing violence -distance from a major road and the ruggedness of the terrain. Both distance and ruggedness are negatively associated with fire incidence and the number of IDPs, suggesting that they make it harder for perpetrators to organize violence. Table 3 shows IV regressions in which the sample was split in half by the median values of Distance to a Major Road and Terrain Ruggedness respec-17 Table 10 in the Supplementary Appendix.
tively. Segregation increases the number of IDPs in places that are closer to the road and easier to access. The substantive effect of segregation on the number of IDPs is higher in this subsample.
By contrast, segregation does not affect the number of IDPs in remote or rugged places. Perhaps it is unsurprising that more people flee easily accessible areas. However, segregation is positively associated with fire incidence in locations close to a road, but not in locations far from one. Segregation is also positively associated with fire incidence in less rugged places, but the estimate on segregation, which has a p-value of 0.12, is not statistically significant at conventional levels.
[ Table 3 about here]
Conclusion
High degrees of ethnic segregation can arise if even a small minority of people prefer to live in ethnically homogenous settings (?). Therefore, it is unsurprising that ethnic tension and violence increase ethnic segregation. However, individual decisions to migrate to segregated areas may have the perverse effect of making communal violence more likely to occur. Although fear of members of other ethnic groups may motivate people to move to ethnically exclusive places, ethnic segregation reduces the possibility of both positive and negative contact across ethnic lines.
Therefore, segregation is correlated with low levels of interethnic trust. As existing research shows, widespread mistrust along ethnic lines helps to explain the severity of communal violence for two reasons. First, elites and extremists find it easier to mobilize support for violence where underlying mistrust is high. Second, perpetrators of violence are less likely to face social sanctions where the public supports violence against members of other ethnic groups.
Determining whether ethnic segregation causes violence presents important empirical challenges. Segregation is difficult to capture because its measurement requires fine-grained data on the distribution of ethnic groups within small areas. Data on actual local ethnic composition are controversial in violence-prone places. Therefore, most of what we know about the impact of segregation comes from the developed world or studies of temporal changes in segregation in a single city. Also, segregation is likely endogenous to violence because people seek ethnically homogenous areas when ethnic conflict occurs.
This paper estimates the effect of segregation on the incidence of violence across 700 localities in Kenya's Rift Valley Province after the disputed 2007 general election. In addition to using original data on local ethnic composition, this paper establishes that segregation causes violence by drawing on Kenya's colonial history to instrument segregation.
Although interethnic trust is lower in segregated areas, research on the spatial distribution of groups in civil wars suggests that segregation at the regional level improves groups' capacity to conduct violence. However, the alternative mechanism linking segregation and violence is unlikely to account for these findings. If segregation improved organizational capacity, we would expect it to have a greater effect on violence where geography makes it more difficult to organize violence, but this is not the case.
This paper draws attention to one reason communal violence recurs. Conflict may be selfreinforcing because violence alters local ethnic demography in ways that increase future conflict.
Although there is little policymakers can do to influence individuals' residential choices, they have greater control over other institutions and organizations that could promote ethnic integration. Therefore, the findings presented have implications for debates across the social sciences regarding whether political institutions that enhance the social and political separation of members of different ethnic groups reduce ethnic conflict. 
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A.1 Estimates of Local Ethnic Composition
Given the unavailability of disaggregated census data on ethnic composition, I construct estimates of ethnic composition at the location level in 2006 by using the 2006 Voter Register and locationlevel data from the 1962 census.
To match names to groups, one would ideally calculate the probability that a person is a member of each ethnic group (g i ) given their last name (P (g i |N ame)). However, it is not possible to calculate this probability given the data. Instead, I calculate the probability that a person having that name falls into an ethnically homogenous administrative location in 1962 and then use these probabilities to match names to groups.
For each of the approximately 500,000 unique name strings in the register I calculate the probability that a person holding it is resident in a location (s i ) where members of ethnic group g i were a supermajority in 1962 (P (s i |N ame)). This probability is calculated for each of the groups in the dataset and names were matched to groups where this probability is highest.
The probability that a person with some name is resident in an area s where group g has a supermajority is
where n is the number of registered voters with the last name and n s is the number of registered voters with that name in area s.
Supermajority areas are defined using the 1962 census, which is the last period for which finegrained data on ethnic composition is available. Because this ethnicity data was in tabular form, I
constructed a map of local-level units in 1962 (?).
I use a conservative threshold of 90% to define supermajority areas. There are 310 supermajor-ity locations, comprising 73% of all locations. I matched names to these groups Embu, Kalenjin, Kikuyu, Kamba, Luhya, Luo, Maasai, Mbeere, Meru, Mijikenda, Orma, Pokomo, Taita, Teso, and Tharaka. Groups were matched to names with the highest value of P (s i |N ame) only if this probability was over three times larger than the probability for the group with the second highest probability to reduce the possibility of misclassifying ethnically ambiguous names. • The proportion of a location's area covered by rangeland (Proportion Rangeland) was calculated using remotely sensed data on landcover (?).
A.2 Polling Stations and Electoral Returns
• Average Monthly Rainfall in a location was estimated using monthly rainfall data for 48 rainfall stations across Kenya from 1988 to 2007, obtained from the Kenya Meteorological Department. Location-level rainfall estimates were generated in ArcGIS using spatial interpolation.
• Altitude is the elevation, in meters, of the center of the location (?).
• Terrain Ruggedness is a measure of the value of the "Terrain (or Topographical) Ruggedness Index" of points falling in a location. The terrain (or topographical) ruggedness index measures elevation change between a point on the grid and the eight points surrounding it (?). 12.78 12.78
B Supplementary Appendix
Note: Continuous variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.5. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. 13.57 13.57
Note: Continuous variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.5. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. Note: Continuous variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.5. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01.
